Revolution in the Board Room? by Ball, David George
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 68 
Number 2 Volume 68, Spring 1994, Number 2 Article 4 
March 2012 
Revolution in the Board Room? 
David George Ball 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ball, David George (1994) "Revolution in the Board Room?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 
4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol68/iss2/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
REVOLUTION IN THE BOARD ROOM?
DAVID GEORGE BALL*
One of the most important things I learned during my career
as a corporate secretary was not to interfere with the chairman's
relationship with the members of the board of directors. As corpo-
rate secretary, I had good reason from time to time to talk with
directors about the agenda or travel arrangements, and some-
times the conversation drifted to general corporate matters. It did
not take long to realize that the chairman liked to be kept in-
formed about his relationship with the board. After all, his au-
thority depended on this relationship.
It must have been very disconcerting for some chief execu-
tives in the 1993 proxy season to find a third party interfering
with this relationship. Big pension funds which are shareholders
requested meetings with outside directors, in private, without the
CEO present. Even more alarming is that the subject matter of
these meetings was poor corporate performance1 and the tenure of
the chief executive officer. Finally, in the case of a few very large
companies, the unexpected events included the early termination
of the CEO. Suddenly, employees of IBM and Eastman Kodak
found themselves with a new boss.2
What do these events signify? Do they mean that the balance
of power between management and shareholders is shifting? Do
they represent a revolution in corporate governance? Or do they
simply reflect a slower evolution which has been underway for
sometime? Finally, what is the attitude of the Clinton adminis-
tration on these changes?
I would like to approach these questions from my own experi-
ence as Assistant Secretary of Labor and as head of the Pension
Former Assistant Secretary of Labor (1989-1993).
1 See, e.g., John Holusha, Eastman Kodak Chief is Ousted by Directors, N.Y.
Tzms, Aug. 7, 1993, at A37 (noting Kodak's poor performance); Steve Lohr, I.B.M.'s
New Leader; Task of Turning Around I.B.M. is Given to an Industry Outsider, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 27, 1993, at Al (mentioning I.B.M.'s business woes). See generally Bigger
They Are, Harder They Fall, PLAiN DEALER, Jan. 2, 1994 (describing trend, backed by
institutional investors, of ousting CEOs).
2 See Jonathan Weber, Kodak Puts Motorola's Chairman in the Picture, L.A.
TmEs, Oct. 28, 1993, at D1; Steve Lohr, I.B.M.'s New Leader, N.Y. TIms, Mar. 27,
1993, at 1.
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and Welfare Benefit Administration ("PWBA"). Under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 ("ERISA7),3 the
PWBA oversees the private pension system, which today has as-
sets of over $2.3 trillion.4 I would also like to draw on my experi-
ence as a corporate secretary running hundreds of board, commit-
tee, and shareholder meetings. These different perspectives have
helped me appreciate the important role that pension plans have
played and are playing in the development of corporate
governance.
Today over fifty million Americans, approximately one-half of
the work force, are participants in, or retirees under, private pen-
sion plans.5 As of 1992, these plans in the aggregate owned equi-
ties worth $975 billion, or twenty percent of all outstanding equi-
ties.' In addition, public plans currently own equities worth
several hundred billion dollars.7
As the percentage of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies'
stock held by pension plans continues to grow, the so-called 'Wall
Street" rule,8 that investment managers should either vote with
management or sell the stock, is no longer economically feasible.'
With the Wall Street rule rendered impractical, it seems that the
managers of pension fund assets must pay attention to matters of
corporate governance in order to maximize the value of their ex-
isting corporate holdings.
The PWBA has vigorously articulated both its legal and policy
positions on corporate governance over the past few years. In a
3 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
4 See Berg's Bully Pulpit, PENSIONS & INVESTmENTs, Sept. 6, 1993, Opinion, at 10.
5 See Leslie Wayne, Seeking Investment with Principle, N.Y. Tnass, Aug. 10,
1993, at D1.
6 See generally Patrick W. Seburn, Evolution of Employer-Provided Defined Bene-
fit Pensions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1991, at 16 (noting that by 1987, defined bene-
fit pension plan assets reached nearly 900 billion); Susan E. Kuhn, The New Perilous
Stock Market, FORTUNE, Dec. 27, 1993, at 48 (noting pension plans own approximately
26% of all stock).
7 See ROBERT A. MONKS & NEIL MINOW, POWER AND AccouNTABILIT 183 (1991)
(noting that public plan equities reach up to several hundred billion dollars).
8 See Labor Department Survey of Burke Finds Proxy Voting Policies in Good Or-
der, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), Feb. 19, 1992; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Will Require
Fuller Disclosure of Executive Pay, N.Y. Tmms, Oct. 15, 1992, at Al (discussing "Wall
Street" rule).
9 Labaton, supra note 8, at Al. "'For too long, the Wall Street rule has been that if
you don't like what's going on, sell out. That has made it difficult and expensive for
shareholders.'" Id. (quoting S.E.C. Chairman Richard D. Breeden).
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nutshell, the Agency's position i0 is: (1) that fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans have a duty to manage plan assets solely in the in-
terests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans;1' (2) that
the ability to vote proxies is a plan asset;12 and (3) that it would be
a dereliction of duty if managers of plan assets did not vote, or
voted without paying close attention to the implications of their
vote concerning the ultimate value of the plan's holdings.'3
It might be useful to share with you the underlying reasons
for the Department's views on corporate governance, give you my
impressions of what is happening in the field, and tell you a little
about what I can see in my crystal ball.
First, it should be noted that the Department's attitude on
corporate governance stems from the view, as Judge Friendly
stated in Donovan v. Bierwirth,'4 that fiduciaries of pension funds
have an obligation to manage their assets with an "eye single" to
benefit the plan participants and beneficiaries.' 5 This means, of
course, that fiduciaries, when choosing between investments of
equal risk, should choose the one that gives a greater return. Sim-
ilarly, when choosing between investments yielding the same re-
turn, fiduciaries should choose those with the least risk. The obvi-
ous corollary of this proposition is that plan fiduciaries have a
duty to manage plan assets so as to preserve or increase their
10 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1992) (describing fiduciary duties of plan man-
ager); Labor Department Letter on Proxy Voting by Plan Fiduciaries (Feb. 23, 1988),
reprinted in Joseph S. Schuchert, Adequate Consideration Determinations in Lever-
aged ESOP Transactions, 271 PL/TAX 519, app. B (1988), available in WESTLAW,
PLI database.
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1993) (requiring "prudent man" standard of care). "[A]
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries." Id. § 1104(a)(1).
12 See Corporate Governance: Ball Signals Continued Commitment to Proxy Vot-
ing Issues at Department, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), Jan. 29, 1990, at 207; DOL Con-
tinues Initiatives on Proxy Voting, Ball Says, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), Sept. 24,
1990, at 1622.
13 John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Cor-
porate Monitor, 91 CoLUmn. L. REv. 1277, 1366 (1991) ("[T]he pension investment man-
ager's strategy ... should be to increase portfolio value .... ").
14 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
15 Id. at 271. Judge Friendly stated:
Although officers of a corporation who are trustees of its pension plan do not
violate their duties as trustees by taking action which, after careful and im-
partial investigation, they reasonably conclude best to promote the interests
of participants and beneficiaries simply because it incidentally benefits the
corporation or, indeed, themselves, their decisions must be made with an eye
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.
Id. (citations omitted).
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value. Therefore, fiduciaries would be derelict in that duty if they
did not vote plan shares on matters which might affect the value
of the shares.
Although this is the legal underpinning for the Department's
position on corporate governance, economic imperatives have had
an equally great role in sensitizing pension fund managers and
other institutional investors to the importance of corporate gov-
ernance issues. A 1989 article in the Harvard Business Review' 6
put forward the theory that institutional investors do not really
need the liquidity the public market offers because they can pro-
ject their cash needs well into the future." It went on to note that
trading is a tough, zero-sum game, and that large funds face "dis-
economics" of scale in executing trades because it is difficult to
trade large blocks of stock quickly.' 8 Furthermore, the very act of
trading such a block tends to move markets. Therefore, the article
suggested that institutional investors will move toward taking
larger positions in a smaller number of companies.' 9 This would
allow them to enhance the value of their investment by actively
participating in the ownership and management of the underlying
assets.2°
16 Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 61.
17 Id.
New organizations are emerging... organizations that are corporate in form
but have no public shareholders and are not listed or traded on organized
exchanges. These organizations use public and private debt rather than
public equity, as their major source of capital. Their primary owners are not
households but large institutions .... These transactions have inspired criti-
cism, even outrage, among many business leaders and government officials
... [but] this organizational innovation should be encouraged. By resolving
the central weakness of the public corporation-the conflict between owners
and managers over the control and use of corporate resources-these new
organizations are making remarkable gains in operating efficiency, em-
ployee productivity, and shareholder value. Over the long term, they will
enhance U.S. economic performance relative to our most formidable interna-
tional competitor, Japan ....
Id.
18 See generally id. (noting that "all told, institutional investors are remarkably
powerless").
19 Id. at 64. "The absence of effective monitoring led to such large inefficiencies
that the new generation of active investors arose to recapture the lost value. These
investors overcome the costs of the outmoded legal constraints by purchasing entire
companies-and using debt and high equity ownership to force effective self-monitor-
ing." Id. (emphasis added).
20 Id.
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A major inhibition of pension funds taking active positions on
corporate governance, beyond merely voting on proposals set forth
by others, were the SEC proxy rules, which required the filing of
written proxy statements before the communication with other
shareholders regarding proxy proposals. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, reacting in part to the Department's position
on corporate governance and to the new economic realities of insti-
tutional investment, adopted new proxy rules on October 15, 1992,
which enable pension funds and large investors to communicate
freely with other investors.2 ' This was an important step in the
evolution of corporate governance.
The new rules will have an impact on shareholder communi-
cation and executive compensation disclosure. Shareholders are
no longer required to file proxy materials with the SEC if they
wish to communicate orally with other shareholders on proxy vot-
ing matters,22 unless they are seeking proxy authority. Now that
investors can communicate freely with each other, they are in a
stronger position to have a more active relationship with corpo-
rate management.
More active shareholder involvement in corporate governance
as a way to create value is, in my view, inevitable. Quite aside
from the fact that ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to cast their
corporate proxy ballot knowledgeably, 23 it stands to reason that
active institutional investors do not invest in corporations that
they believe are fully valued against future expectations. Rather,
they invest in corporations that they believe are undervalued
against future expectations. Therefore, as fiduciaries on behalf of
their participants and beneficiaries, pension fund managers
should examine proxy proposals and corporate governance issues
to determine whether they will add to or detract from the value of
the corporation over the time frame of the investment, and vote
accordingly.
21 See David R. Sands, S.E.C.'s Sunlight'Reforms Usher in Mew Era of Corporate
Governance', WASH. TziEs, Apr. 15, 1993, at C1.
The SEC changes, approved by the agency after heated debate, fall into two
broad categories. Companies must clearly disclose how much money and
other forms of compensation they gave their top executives last year. Also,
the agency adopted rules designed to make it easier for shareholders to talk
among themselves about their holdings.
Id.
22 Id.
23 See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 270-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982).
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Actions designed to insulate corporate management from the
discipline of the marketplace are, as a general matter, unhealthy
for the corporation, its workers, and the economy at large. A cor-
porate management that is insulated from the discipline of the
marketplace is likely to become inefficient and fail to maximize
value for shareholders. Moreover, it is unlikely to provide stable
employment for its workers over the long term.
This is not to say that I advocate an adversarial relationship
between pension plans and corporate management. Pension
plans, which generally are accumulating funds for benefit pay-
ments in the future, are in a particularly good position to be pa-
tient, long-term investors. Just as plans do not necessarily gain
by selling shares of stock every time they disagree with manage-
ment, in general, it is preferable for plans that are large share-
holders in companies to share their concerns with management
and to try to resolve them before they get involved in tender offers
or proxy contests to unseat management. Shareholders should be
treated as partners in achieving a corporation's long-term goals.
Effective corporate governance would greatly reduce the pres-
sure for hostile takeovers because management and shareholders
would then more closely share the same goal. If American corpo-
rations desire patient capital to compete in today's global market,
our corporate managers must listen to their shareholders' voices.
Patient investing requires participation. Directors of companies
that try to erect barriers to shareholder involvement in corporate
governance will sooner or later face hostile takeovers or proxy
fights, as shareholders seek to realize the underlying value of
their shares.
Fortunately, there are signs that corporate management is
listening. The 1993 proxy season provided evidence that manage-
ment is increasingly sensitive to and willing to respond to large
investors. The season itself was marked by quiet diplomacy by
pension funds and investors, rather than ugly proxy solicitations
and takeover battles. The 1994 proxy season promises to follow
the same patterns. Several big public plans have said that they
prefer to negotiate first before they announce which companies
they are targeting. Both management and activists seem willing
to discuss, in a nonconfrontational manner, critical issues such as
executive compensation, poor performance, or lack of independent
directors.
[Vol. 68:329
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This strategy is a good example of "relationship investing."24
Relationship investing seeks to decrease the number of companies
in which a fund is invested and to boost its holdings in particular
companies to as high as fifteen to twenty percent of the outstand-
ing shares.25 The strategy seeks to develop close, long-term rela-
tionships with the companies. The proponents of relationship in-
vesting hope that it will help break down an insulated culture at
some companies and lead to more timely action at companies with
poor performance.
What is the Clinton agenda for corporate governance? My suc-
cessor, Olena Berg, has indicated that she intends to continue to
devote a good amount of the limited resources of PWBA to corpo-
rate governance.26 Recently, I served as chairman of a conference
on corporate governance in New York City. One of the speakers
was Susan P. Thomases,27 who as you know was active in the
1992 presidential campaign and continues to serve as an informal
advisor to both the President and the First Lady. She advocated a
single ballot for the election of directors instead of the current
practice which requires a separate ballot for each competing slate.
It seems to me that a single ballot for the election of directors
is extremely unlikely at the present time. There is virtually no
support for such a change in the marketplace. There are, how-
ever, other changes occurring which will continue the evolution of
corporate governance.
At least three developments will be driven by more active
shareholder involvement in corporate governance as a way to cre-
ate value. These changes will reflect a growing sensitivity on the
part of management to the shareholders.
I. MoRE MEANINGFUL COMMUNICATION
The first development is a trend toward more meaningful
communication. Pension funds want to talk directly to members
24 See David A. Vise, Shifting the Boardroom Balance of Power; Pension Funds
Weigh Large-Strike, Long-Term 'Relationship Investing' in Firms, WAsH. POST, Mar.
6, 1993, at DI (discussing "cutting-edge" concept of relationship investing).
25 Id. ('Those who promote relationship investing say that individual pension
fimds should direct some of their billions of dollars toward the purchase of large, long-
term ownership stakes, perhaps as much as 15 percent to 20 percent, in a number of
public companies.").
26 See Berg's Bully Pulpit, supra note 4, at 10 (characterizing Berg's position as
"government meddling in investment management decisions").
27 Susan P. Thomases is presently a partner in the law firm Willkie Farr &
Gallagher.
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of the board, rather than have their views filtered through man-
agement. This is already happening, and of course, it has the po-
tential to make management very nervous. Suddenly, the board
of directors is in the investor relations business. Pension funds
are seeking regular, periodic meetings with outside directors to
discuss governance issues and particularly corporate perform-
ance. As a general matter, better communication will lead to
changes in a company's strategy, which will add value.
Relatedly, there is a trend toward more meaningful communi-
cation with mutual funds, which are governed by the Investment
Company Act 28 and not by ERISA. Fidelity funds, for example,
now say that they are voting for control.29 This frees them to com-
municate with other big holders as they seek to maximize value.
Fidelity encourages portfolio managers to challenge corporate
management on such issues as staggered terms for directors, com-
pensation, and anti-takeover measures.3 0
Historically, private money managers have enjoyed regular
access to corporate executives, although not usually to the chief
executive officer or the board. In the future, we are likely to see
corporate pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds
become less reluctant to communicate their views. For instance, it
has been reported that Alliance Capital Management, Putnam
Management, and J.P. Morgan were active in connection with the
installation of a new CEO at American Express.' In July 1993,
Campbell Soup announced the establishment of proxy voting
guidelines for its pension fund managers in order to communicate
its views on specific issues related to corporate governance. 2 In
October, TIAA-CREF, the giant pension fund for teachers, an-
nounced a corporate governance policy and mailed it to all 1500
companies in which it holds stock.33 It is also significant that sev-
28 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80b-18 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
29 See generally David G. Ball, Where the Government Stands on Proxy Voting;
Special Report: Pension Fund Management, FIN. ExEcuTiVE, July, 1990, at 31 (stat-
ing fidelity funds have changed stated goals to invest for control).
30 Id.
31 See Bigger They Are, Harder They Fall, supra note 1, at 1E (characterizing J.P.
Morgan as institutional "rabble-rouser[ ]" in investor effort to remove American Ex-
press chairman).
32 See Campbell Soup's Proxy Guidelines Aim to Highlight Governance Issues,
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA), July 19, 1993, at 1521.
33 See Jim Connolly, TIAA-CREF Asked to Take Its Own Advice on Salaries, LIFE
& HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Oct. 18, 1993, at 43.
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eral large corporate pension funds have recently joined the Coun-
cil of Institutional Investors.
II. MoRE OUTSIDE DmECTORS
The second development that I predicted in my crystal ball
was a growing demand for more outside directors. When I first
became a corporate secretary in 1969, insiders constituted a ma-
jority of most boards. According to a 1992 Korn/Ferry study, the
average board now consists of nine outside directors and three in-
side directors.34 The trend toward outside directors will continue.
This is, in part, a reflection of increasing skepticism about man-
agement insulation and entrenchment. It is also a reflection of
shareholder demands that the board take a more active role in
managing companies. Pension plans are unlikely to put their own
representatives on corporate boards because the restrictions on in-
sider trading under section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 would make it difficult for the funds to buy or sell
shares. 5 What they are likely to do is move toward relationship
investing and rely on outside directors to represent their interests.
Thus, Campbell Soup's strategy will be to tell its money managers
to vote Campbell's proxies against companies that elect more than
three inside directors.3 6 TIAA-CREF's goal is to "sharpen the ac-
34 See KoRN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF DmECTORs NINTrENTH ANNUAL
STuDY 9 (1992).
35 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1981). Section
16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in en-
tering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not re-
purchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months .... This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such bene-
ficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the
sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transac-
tions which the commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
Id.
36 See Corporate Board Should Consist of Independent Directors, Pension Fund
Says, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), Nov. 1, 1993, at 1.
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countability of directors to shareholders."37 This includes requir-
ing directors to own common shares so that their interests match
those of shareholders.
Pressure from outside directors is likely to intensify the sensi-
tivity of management to the best interests of the shareholders.
Shareholders will not settle for rubber stamp approval by direc-
tors of management actions. The recent departures of CEOs at
General Motors, IBM, Westinghouse, and Eastman Kodak are at-
tributable to the actions of institutional shareholders and outside
directors.38
III. INDEPENDENT NOMINATING CoMITT=EEs
The third development foreseen is increasing pressure for a
nominating committee made up exclusively of outside directors.3 9
This has already happened with audit committees as a result of a
New York Stock Exchange rule.4 ° Independent audit committees
play an important role in assuring the integrity of corporate fi-
nances. Pressure for independent nominating committees may hit
a nerve in terms of the traditional prerogative of the chief execu-
tive officer. There is no reason, however, why independent com-
mittees need to be perceived as threatening to a successful man-
ager. Independent committees can function effectively with the
CEO as an important participant, who can occasionally be ex-
cluded when the committees meet in executive session.
There is already some evidence that, under pressure from
pension funds and institutional holders, boards have been limiting
insiders' participation in choosing new directors. Thus, in 1993
the CEO stepped down from the nominating committee at both
37 Id. "The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Eq-
uities Fund said a corporate board should include audit, compensation, and nominat-
ing committees consisting entirely of independent directors." Id. TIAA-CREF believes
that "the rights of shareholders should be balanced by 'need of the management and
the board to direct the corporation's affairs free from distracting short-term pres-
sures.'" Id.
38 See Thomas A. Stewart, The King is Dead, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 34 (not-
ing increased influence institutional investors have on corporate executives). "Execu-
tives.., must let institutional investors into the tent or force damaging proxy fights
or-perhaps worse-uncertain access to capital markets." Id.
39 See Brigid McMenamin, Help Wanted, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1993, at 186. "Almost
two-thirds of the firms that responded to a recent... survey said they now use in-
dependent nominating committees, compared with less than half ten years ago." Id.
40 See John Curran, SECs Ruder Defends Stance on Audit Committees to Con-
gress, REUTER Bus. REP., May 2, 1988 ("Currently, the New York Stock Exchange
requires all listed firms to have entirely independent audit committees.")
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Sears41 and Campbell Soup.42 Recently, IBM established a new
board committee of outside directors which will nominate direc-
tors, handle proposals from shareholders, and oversee the power
structure of the board.43 Previously, the nominating authority
had been held by an insider-dominated executive committee.4 4
Furthermore, in December 1992, Westinghouse formed a nomi-
nating committee of outside directors.45
At this point, I would like to comment on one change in gov-
ernance that seems unlikely to occur. Some commentators have
suggested a division of responsibilities at the top of a company in
order to ensure a balance of power and authority. Massachusetts
Representative Edward Markey has suggested that corporations
be required to split the positions of chairman and chief executive
officer.46 This was proposed at the 1993 Sears, Roebuck & Co. an-
nual meeting by the New York City Employees Retirement Sys-
tem and shareholder activists, and supported by over one-third of
the votes cast.4 Furthermore, in most British companies the
chairman of the board is not the chief executive officer.48 The
41 See Sears Board Grants Some Proposals at Request of Institutional Investors,
Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), June 22, 1992. As a result of pressure from institutional
investors the board restricted membership on the nominating committee to outside
directors, forcing Sears Chairman and CEO Edward Brennan from the committee. Id.
42 See Campbell Soup's Proxy Guidelines Aim to Highlight Governance Issues,
Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), July 20, 1993. "President and [CEO] David W. Johnson,
recently stepped down from the board's nominating committee, in part to advance
good corporate governance principles." Id.
43 See McMenamin, supra note 39, at 186. I.B.M. recently appointed a new nomi-
nating committee that actually welcomes suggestions from shareholders. Id.
44 See Leslie Cauley, Shareholders Demand IBM Make Changes, USA TODAY,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 1B (discussing demands United Shareholders made to IBM in Janu-
ary of 1993).
45 See Westinghouse Adopts New Corporate Governance Provisions, PR NEw-
swipE, Dec. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business File.
46 See generally Executive Compensation; Corporate America's Most Powerful Peo-
ple, FoRBYs, May 24, 1993, at 114 (noting leverage CEO who is also chairman has
over board members).
47 See Steve Lohr, Pulling Down the Corporate Clubhouse, N.Y. TnIMs, Apr. 12,
1992, § 3, at 1 (noting that two institutional investors, New York City Employees Re-
tirement System and United Shareholders, are sponsoring proxy resolution sent to
Sears, Roebuck and Co.'s 1000 largest shareholders, urging them to vote to split jobs
of chairman and chief executive between two people); Ellen Neuborne & Michael Os-
borne, Shareholder Revolt at Sears : Mutual Funds, Pensions Lead the Charge, USA
TODAY, May 15, 1992, Money, at 1B (noting that proposal to separate posts of chair-
man and chief executive received 27% of shareholder vote).
48 See Neville Nankivel, Shaw Has Sweetest Job as Head of Tate & Lyle, FIN.
Posy, June 26, 1993, § 5, at S14 (noting increasing pressure to separate jobs of chair-
man and chief executive to improve corporate performance); Hanson to Name New
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chair sets the agenda for board meetings and presides at board
and shareholder meetings. Frequently the chair will speak for the
company. The chief executive officer manages the company.
Although some American companies do indeed divide respon-
sibilities, it seems that such a separation is unnecessary and, in
some cases, even undesirable. It could create the potential for ri-
valry which would lead to compromise and confusion. It would
dilute the ability of the chief executive to provide effective
leadership.
Furthermore, management's knowledge and experience with
regard to the day to day operations of the company will almost
always be greater than that of a nonexecutive chairman involved
on a part-time basis. Effective corporate governance can be
achieved without this artificial separation of powers; it simply is
not necessary! The development of a strong and independent
counterweight at the top level will occur as the natural result of
the evolutionary process that is now occurring. The trend toward
more outside directors, independent compensation, and nominat-
ing committees will improve management sensitivity and account-
ability. The trend will also enable outside directors to discharge
their monitoring function properly, and thus help assure effective
corporate governance.
When we assume positions of responsibility, we are all at risk
of becoming surrounded by people who tell us what they think we
want to hear, thereby insulating us from the interests and pres-
sures of the everyday world. This is a risk for the President of the
United States, and it is a risk for the chief executive officer of a
large company. As pension fund giants are becoming involved in
governance issues, they are beginning to challenge this insulation
which has a profound effect on corporate America.
CONCLUSION
I have identified three developments that can be foreseen in
corporate governance: more meaningful communications, more
outside directors, and independent nominating committees. What
Chairman, REUTERS, Apr. 21, 1992, Financial Report, at 1 (identifying new appoint-
ment of CEO in British company as separate from role of executive chairman). "The
fact that 76 percent of chairmen combine the role of chief executive may seem a touch
unlikely to a U.K audience. Since the publication of the Cadbury report on corporate
governance in 1991, splitting the two jobs in big companies has become very much de
rigueur." Tim Dickson, Moving Toward Independence-The Changing Face of U.S.
Boardrooms, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, Management, at 9.
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do they mean for corporate management? Their significance can
be summed up in two words-greater accountability. As a general
matter, management will become less insulated and more sensi-
tive to the best interests of shareholders. The attention of chief
executive officers will be increasingly focused on their accountabil-
ity in the real world. As Dr. Samuel Johnson said: "Depend upon
it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it
concentrates his mind wonderfully."49
These three developments have been underway in the mar-
ketplace for some time. This is not a revolution; these changes
will not mature overnight or all at once, although I believe they
will be the norm within the next ten to fifteen years. Although in
a small number of corporations management may resist the
changes because the CEO feels threatened, such resistance is not
really in the best interest of the shareholders. Sooner or later,
with the support of pension funds and institutional investors,
changes are going to happen. The process has already begun with
the large high-profile companies at the center of economic activity,
and over time they will gradually ripple throughout the market-
place to middle size and smaller companies.
The evolution will occur partly through proxy contests won by
shareholders. However, it will also come through the heightened
sensitivity of corporate management responding to demands of
pension funds and institutional investors on issues of corporate
governance. The evolutionary process will be driven by the mar-
ketplace. There is no need for legislation to mandate change,
although perhaps one day the New York Stock Exchange will
amend its listing agreement to require independent nominating
committees. As institutional investors hold an ever increasing
share of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies, corporate manage-
ment will become increasingly responsive to these issues, and as a
result, there will be fewer, rather than more, proxy contests over
governance.
During my service as head of the Agency, some people asked
me why the PWBA devoted a good amount of its limited resources
to corporate governance, a field that is unlikely to yield massive
recoveries even when violations are discovered. My answer was,
and I believe that the answer of the Clinton administration is,
that pension plan fiduciaries must act as owners of the companies
49 See J~mEs BOSWELL, LiFE OF JOHNSON (quoting a letter of Sept. 19, 1977, as
quoted in JA1is BARTLTr, FALa~AR QUOTATIONS 432a (14th ed. 1968)).
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in which they hold shares. Fiduciaries must act both to protect
the value of the shares that they own on behalf of plan partici-
pants, and in a broader sense, to assure that corporate manage-
ment acts in the best interest of all shareholders. At the same
time, management should treat shareholders, including pension
plans, as partners and not adversaries. As Assistant Secretary I
was proud of the fact that we identified these issues early on as
matters of importance both to pension plans and to society gener-
ally. We not only brought significantly increased compliance in
this area but also made a significant contribution to the evolution
of corporate governance.
